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Abstract—Providing an adequate long-term participation in-
centive is important for a participatory sensing system to main-
tain enough number of active users (sensors), so as to collect a
sufficient number of data samples and support a desired level of
service quality. In this work, we consider the sensor selection
problem in a general time-dependent and location-aware partici-
patory sensing system, taking the long-term user participation
incentive into explicit consideration. We study the problem
systematically under different information scenarios, regarding
both future information and current information (realization).
In particular, we propose a Lyapunov-based VCG auction policy
for the on-line sensor selection, which converges asymptotically
to the optimal off-line benchmark performance, even with no
future information and under (current) information asymmetry.
Extensive numerical results show that our proposed policy out-
performs the state-of-art policies in the literature, in terms of both
user participation (e.g., reducing the user dropping probability by
25% ∼ 90%) and social performance (e.g., increasing the social
welfare by 15% ∼ 80%).
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivations
The proliferation of mobile devices (e.g., smartphones)
with rich embedded sensors has led to revolutionary new sens-
ing paradigm, often known as Participatory Sensing [1]–[3],
in which mobile users voluntarily participate in and actively
contribute to sensing system, using their carrying smartphones.
Due to the low deploying cost and high sensing coverage, this
new paradigm has attracted a wide range of applications in
environment, infrastructure, and community monitoring (e.g.,
air pollution [4]–[6], wireless signal strengths [7]–[9], road
traffic [10]–[12], and parking [13], [14]).
A typical participatory sensing system architecture usually
consists of a service platform (also called service provider)
residing in the cloud and a collection of mobile smartphone
users [16]–[18]. The service provider launches a set of sensing
tasks with different sensing requirements for different pur-
poses, and mobile users actively subscribe to (participate in)
one or multiple sensing task(s). In this work, we focus on
an important type of participatory sensing scheme called the
server-initiated sensing, where the service provider selects a
specific set of participating smartphones to perform the sensing
task, depending on the spatio-temporal data requirement of the
sensing task and the geographical locations of the participating
users as well as their sensing capabilities. Comparing with
the user-initiated sensing scheme (where users actively decide
when and where to sense), the server-initiated sensing scheme
gives more control to the service provider to decide when and
where to collect the data at what costs, hence can better fit the
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requirements of sensing tasks. Clearly, the success of such a
sensing system strongly relies on the active participations of
users as well as their willingnesses to contribute their sensing
capability and resource to the sensing tasks.
Although many participatory sensing applications have
been proposed in [4]–[14], they simply assume that users
voluntarily participate in the system to perform sensing tasks.
In reality, however, users may not be willing to participate in
the sensing system, as this will incur extra operational cost
(e.g., the battery energy expenditure and the transmission ex-
pense). Moreover, many sensing tasks are location-aware and
time-dependent, and involve spatio-temporal context. Sharing
sensing data tagged with spatio-temporal context may reveal a
lot of personal and sensitive information, which poses potential
privacy threats to the participating users [15]. All of these bring
the incentive issue to the fore.
Several recent works have been devoted to the incentive
mechanism design issue in participatory sensing, mainly using
pricing and auction [17]–[25]. Most of them focus on com-
pensating the user’s direct sensing cost when being chosen
as a sensor to perform a particular sensing task (e.g., in
[17]–[23]), which we call the short-term sensing incentive.
In practice, however, we find that the users participating in
a sensing task may suffer certain indirect cost even when
not performing the sensing task.1 In this case, the short-term
sensing incentive may not be enough to guarantee the long-
term continuous participations of users. Intuitively, if a user is
rarely selected as a sensor (hence hardly receives the short-term
sensing incentive), the user may lose the interest in continuous
participation and decide to drop out of the sensing system (e.g.,
shut down the sensing app on his smartphone). Without an
adequate number of users participating in the system, however,
the service provider may not be able to collect a sufficient
number of sensing data to support a desired service quality
(e.g., miss the road traffic informaiton in some areas).
To the best of our knowledge, [24] and [25] are the only
results that explicitly study the long-term participation in-
centive in participatory sensing. To stimulate the continuous
participation of users, Lee et al. in [24] and [25] introduce
a virtual credit for lowering the bids of users who lost in
the previous round of auction, hence increasing their winning
probabilities in future auction rounds. However, they consider
neither the truthfulness, nor the optimality of the proposed
auction. In this work, we will study the long-term participatory
incentive, joint with the short-term sensing incentive, with
rigorous truthfulness and optimality analysis.
1For example, in a location-aware sensing task, users need to periodically
report their locations to the service provider before the latter makes the sensor
selection decision, which incurs certain energy and transmission cost.
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Fig. 1. Location-Aware Participatory Sensing Model.
B. Solutions and Contributions
Specifically, we consider a general location-aware, time-
dependent participatory sensing system, where the data in
different time (slots) and/or locations may have different values
for the sensing tasks. Each participating user has the potential
to sense a specific region (at a certain sensing cost) in a specific
time slot, depending on his location and mobility pattern. Fig. 1
illustrates a snapshot of such a sensing system (in a particular
time slot), where the sensing region of each user is denoted
by the shadow area around the user. In such a system, the
service provider selects (allocates) users as sensors to perform
sensing tasks slot by slot. We focus on the following sensor
selection/allocation problem for the service provider:
• Which users should be selected as sensors in each time
slot, aiming at maximizing the social welfare and ensuring the
long-term participation incentive of users?
The problem is challenging due to the following reasons. First,
the overlap of different users’ sensing regions makes their
sensing activities possibly redundant (hence partially “conflict”
with each other). Second, the long-term participation incentive
of users makes the sensor allocations in different time slots
coupled. Based on the above, our model and problem formula-
tion capture the following important features of a participatory
sensing system: (i) long-term participation incentive, (ii) time-
dependent and location-aware sensing requirement, and (iii)
partial conflicting sensing activity. As far as we know, this is
the first work that systematically studies a participatory sensing
problem with all of the above features.
We solve the above sensor selection problem under differ-
ent information scenarios, regarding both future information
(i.e., complete, stochastic, or no future information) and cur-
rent information (i.e., symmetric or asymmetric). Specifically,
with complete or stochastic future information, we formulate
and solve an off-line sensor selection problem as benchmark
(where we assume that the current information is always
symmetric). With no future information, we formulate and
solve an on-line sensor selection problem: (i) under informa-
tion symmetry, we propose a Lyapunov-based on-line sensor
selection policy (Policy 1), which converges to the optimal
off-line benchmark asymptotically; and (ii) under information
asymmetry, we propose a Lyapunov-based VCG auction policy
(Policy 2), which is truthful, and meanwhile achieves the same
TABLE I. MAIN RESULTS IN THIS PAPER
Future Info. Current Info. Solution Performance Section
Complete /
Stochastic Symmetric Off-line
Optimal
(Benchmark) III
No Info Symmetric On-line Policy 1 Asymptotic Opt. IV
No Info Asymmetric On-line Policy 2 Asymptotic Opt. V
asymptotically optimal performance as in Policy 1.2
It is important to note that the key contributions of this
work are not on the Lyapunov framework itself, but rather,
on the novel problem formulation and solution techniques. For
more clarity, we list the main results in Table I, and summarize
the key contributions as follows.
• Novel Model and Problem Formulation: We study a gen-
eral time-dependent and location-aware participatory sensing
system, taking into consideration the important but less studied
issue of long-term user participation incentive. We propose a
simple yet representative formulation based on the allocation
probability of each user to capture such an incentive.
• Multiple Information Scenarios: We study the optimal
sensor selection problem under different information scenarios.
In particular, we propose on-line sensor selection policies that
converge to the asymptotically optimal performance, even with
no future information and under information asymmetry.
• Performance Evaluations: We compare the proposed
on-line policies with the state-of-art policies, and show our
proposed policies outperform the existing ones significantly,
in terms of both user participation and social performance:
(i) Comparing with the RADP-VPC policy proposed in [24]
[25], our policies can reduce the user dropping probability by
25% ∼ 50%, and increase the social welfare by 15% ∼ 40%;
(ii) Comparing with the Greedy/Random policy widely used in
existing systems (e.g., [10]), our policies can reduce the user
dropping probability by 70% ∼ 90%, and increase the social
welfare by 65% ∼ 80%.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a location-aware participatory sensing system
with a service provider (SP) and a set N , {1, ..., N} of
mobile smartphone users (participating in the system). The SP
wants to collect specific data in a certain area (via participating
users’ smartphones) for specific tasks. Mobile users move
randomly in and out of the desirable sensing area according to
certain mobility pattern. As shown in Fig. 1, each user has the
potential to sense a specific region in a certain period according
to his location and mobility, and the whole sensing area A is
divided into a set I = {1, ..., I} of grids.3 Each grid Ai, i ∈ I,
is associated with a weight wi[t], denoting the value of the data
associated with grid Ai in each slot t. Obviously, such a data
value is location-aware and time-dependent.
The SP requests data slot by slot, where each time slot
ranges from minutes to hours depending on the temporal data
requirements of tasks. We consider the sensing operation in a
long period consisting of a set T , {1, ..., T} of T slots. At
2Several recent works also studied the on-line policy for sensing task
allocation, considering the uncertainty of user arrival [26], [27]. However,
these works did not consider the user long-term participation incentive.
3A grid is the minimum unit of sensing area at a particular location, e.g.,
a square of 100m× 100m, associated with a single data in a particular time.
3the beginning of each time slot, the SP selects (allocates) a set
of users to perform the sensing task in that time slot, depending
on factors such as the user locations and the data values. Let
xn[t] ∈ {0, 1} denote whether a user n is selected as sensor in
slot t, and x[t] , {xn[t],∀n ∈ N} denote the sensor selection
vector in slot t. We further denote xn , {xn[t],∀t ∈ T } as
the allocation vector of user n in all time slots.
A. Mobile User Modeling
1) Sensing Region: Each mobile user has a certain sensing
range in each time slot, mainly depending on his location and
mobility pattern. In Fig. 1, the sensing region of each user is
illustrated by the shadow area around the user. Let zn,i[t] ∈
{0, 1} denote whether a grid Ai is located in the sensing range
of user n in slot t. Then, the total sensing region of user n in
each slot t can be defined as a vector: zn[t] , {zn,i[t],∀i ∈ I}.
Note that when user n moves out of the desirable sensing area
in time slot t, we can simply define: zn,i[t] = 0,∀i ∈ I. As
mobile users move randomly, the sensing region zn[t] of each
user n also changes randomly across time slots.
2) Sensing Value: When a user n is selected as sensor in a
slot t, i.e., xn[t] = 1, he performs the following sensing task:
collect, process, and transmit all of the data within his sensing
region zn[t] to the SP. This generates a sensing value vn[t]
equal to the sum of weights of all grids within zn[t]:
vn[t] , xn[t] ·
∑
i∈I
zn,i[t] · wi[t]. (1)
3) Sensing Cost: When performing sensing tasks, users
incur extra operational cost (called sensing cost) due to, for
example, the energy expenditure and the transmission expense.
Let cn[t] denote the total sensing cost of user n in slot t
(including all potential expense used for collecting, processing,
and transmitting the data within zn[t] to the SP). Obviously,
such a sensing cost is user- and time-dependent.
Due to this direct sensing cost, users may be reluctant to
perform sensing tasks without sufficient incentives. To avoid
this, in each time slot, the SP will pay certain monetary or non-
monetary compensation (which we call the short-term sensing
incentive) to those users who are selected as sensors. Later we
will show that this type of incentive can be easily addressed
through, for example, a first-degree price discrimination [28]
or a truthful auction [29] in each time slot.
4) Participatory Constraint: As discussed in Section I,
users may suffer certain indirect cost even when not perform-
ing sensing tasks, induced by, for example, reporting location /
mobility information or running sensing apps. Thus, if a user
is rarely selected as a sensor (hence hardly receives the short-
term sensing incentive), he may gradually lose the interest in
continuous participation, and decide to no longer participate
in the system (in this case, we say the user drops).
As shown in [24] and [25], such a long-term participation
incentive strongly depends on the user’s Return on Investment
(ROI). In this work, instead of directly estimating the total
return and total investment, we use a simple yet representative
indicator to reflect the user ROI: Allocation Probability,4 i.e.,
the probability of each user being selected as sensor. Namely,
we consider such a scenario where each user n will drop out
of the sensing system, if his allocation probability (of being
selected as sensor) is smaller than a specific threshold Dn,
called the dropping threshold of user n. Therefore, to ensure
the active participation of users, the allocation probability of
each user should be no smaller than his dropping threshold,
which we call the user participatory constraint:
Dn ≤ dn(xn) , 1
T
∑
t∈T
xn[t], ∀n ∈ N , (2)
where dn(xn) is the time average allocation probability of user
n, depending on the allocations of user n in all slots.
B. Service Provider Modeling
Given the setN of mobile users participating in the system,
the SP selects a subset of users as sensors in each time
slot. We consider a non-commercial SP (e.g., a non-profit
organization or a governmental department), whose primary
goal is to maximize the total sensing value and minimize the
total sensing cost in the entire time period, subjecting to the
user participatory constraint in (2).
Given the allocation vector x[t] , {xn[t],∀n ∈ N} in slot
t, the total sensing cost (in slot t) can be directly defined as
the sum of all selected users’ sensing costs, i.e.,
C[t] ,
∑
n∈N
xn[t] · cn[t]. (3)
The total sensing value (in slot t), however, may not be same
as the aggregate sensing value of all selected users due to the
overlap of their sensing regions. The key reason is that the
same data collected by multiple users simultaneously can only
generate value once. For convenience, let yi[t] denote whether
a grid Ai is sensed by at least one mobile user, that is,
yi[t] ,
⌈∑
n∈N
xn[t] · zn,i[t]
⌉1
, (4)
where dxe1 = 1 if x ≥ 1, and dxe1 = x if x < 1. Then, the
total sensing value (in slot t) can be defined as follows:
V [t] ,
∑
i∈I
yi[t] · wi[t]. (5)
Obviously, if the sensing regions of all selected users do not
overlap with each other, then yi[t] =
∑
n∈N xn[t] · zn,i[t], and
V [t] =
∑
n∈N vn[t] · xn[t], i.e., the total sensing value is di-
rectly the sum of all selected users’ sensing values.
The social welfare generated in each slot t is the differ-
ence between the total sensing value and sensing cost, i.e.,
S[t] , V [t]− C[t]. (6)
The overall (average) social welfare in all time slots is
S(x) , 1
T
∑
t∈T
S[t] =
1
T
∑
t∈T
(V [t]− C[t]) , (7)
where x , {xn[t],∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T } , {x[t],∀t ∈ T }.
4Consider, for example, a user with an expected direct sensing cost c1,
an expected indirect sensing cost c2, and an expected return r when being
selected as a sensor. Then, an allocation probability η directly corresponds to
an expected ROI: r·η
η·(c1+c2)+(1−η)·c2 .
4C. Information Scenario
We will study the sensor selection problem in different net-
work information scenarios. The network information consists
of the weight (data value) of each grid, the sensing region and
sensing cost of each user in each time slot. Formally, we define
the network information in time slot t as:
θ[t] , {wi[t], zn[t], cn[t], ∀i ∈ I, n ∈ N}. (8)
Note that the sensing value vn[t] of each user is not network
information, as it is determined by wi[t] and zn[t].
Regarding the future network information, we consider
the scenarios of complete future information, stochastic future
information, and no future information, depending on whether
and how much the SP knows regarding the future network
information. Regarding the current network information (real-
ization), we consider the scenarios of information symmetry
and asymmetry, depending on whether the SP can observe the
private information of users (e.g., the sensing cost).
III. OFF-LINE SENSOR SELECTION BENCHMARK
In this section, we study the sensor selection problem with
complete future information and stochastic future information
(as benchmarks). Note that in these benchmark cases, we
assume the scenario of information symmetry (regarding the
current network information), where the SP is able to observe
all of the network information realized in each time slot.
A. Complete Future Information
With complete future information, the SP is able to deter-
mine the sensor selections in all time slots jointly to maximize
the overall social welfare. Thus, the SP’s problem is
max
x
1
T
∑
t∈T
(
V [t]− C[t])
s.t. (a) xn[t] ∈ {0, 1}, ∀n ∈ N ,∀t ∈ T ,
(b) Dn ≤ dn(xn), ∀n ∈ N .
(9)
Obviously, (9) is an off-line allocation problem, and the solu-
tion presents the explicit allocation of each user in each time
slot in advance. Note that (9) is a binary integer programming,
and can be effectively solved by many classic methods, such
as the branch-and-bound algorithm in [31].
It is easy to see that formulating and solving (9) requires the
complete future information, which is obviously impractical.
Hence, we will study another benchmark solution based on the
stochastic information in the next subsection.
B. Stochastic Future Information
With stochastic information only, the SP cannot decide the
explicit allocation of each user in each time slot in advance,
due to the lack of complete future information. Hence, in this
case, we will focus on the expected social welfare maximiza-
tion based on the stochastic information.
Let xn(θ) ∈ {0, 1} denote whether a user n is selected
as sensor under a particular information realization θ, x(θ) ,
{xn(θ),∀n ∈ N} denote the allocation vector of all users
under θ, and xn , {xn(θ),∀θ ∈ Θ} denote the allocation of
user n under all possible θ. Then, the expected social welfare
maximization problem can be defined as follows:5
max
x
∫
θ∈Θ
(
V (θ)− C(θ)) · f(θ)dθ
s.t. (a) xn(θ) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀n ∈ N ,∀θ ∈ Θ,
(b) Dn ≤ dn(xn), ∀n ∈ N ,
(10)
where
• C(θ) = ∑n∈N xn(θ) · cn(θ) is the sensing cost under θ;• V (θ) = ∑i∈I yi(θ) · wi(θ) is the sensing value under θ;• yi(θ) = d∑n∈N xn(θ) ·zn,i(θ)e1 indicates whether a gridAi is sensed by at least one user under θ;
• dn(xn) =
∫
θ∈Θ xn(θ) · f(θ)dθ is the average allocation
probability of user n.
Similarly, (10) is an off-line problem, and the solution
defines a contingency plan that specifies the allocation of
each user under each possible information realization θ in
advance. Note that (10) is an integer programming with an
infinite number of decision variables (as θ is continuous),
which is non-convex and NP-hard. Nevertheless, by the linear
programming relaxation, we can easily transform (10) into a
linear programming problem, and solve it by classic methods,
e.g., the KKT analysis.6
Next we analyze the gap between the maximum social wel-
fare with complete information (denoted by S◦) derived from
(9) and the maximum expected social welfare with stochastic
information (denoted by S∗) derived from (10). Formally,
Lemma 1. If T →∞, then S∗ → S◦.
Lemma 1 indicates that as long as the total sensing period
T is large enough, the social welfare loss induced by the loss
of complete network information is negligible. Hence, both
S◦ and S∗ will serve as the same benchmark for the on-line
policies proposed in Sections IV and V.
It is notable that formulating and solving (10) still requires
certain (stochastic) future information, which may not be
available in practice. This motivates us to further study on-line
policies not relying on any future information.
IV. ON-LINE SENSOR SELECTION POLICY
In this section, we study the sensor selection problem with
no future information. We propose an on-line sensor selection
policy based on the Lyapunov optimization framework [30],
which relies only on the current network information and past
sensor selection history, while not on any future information.
Meanwhile, it asymptotically converges to the benchmark with
complete or stochastic future information proposed in Section
III. Note that we also assume the scenario of information
symmetry in this section, and will further study the scenario
of information asymmetry in the next section.
A. Lyapunov Optimization Technique
Lyapunov optimization [30] is a widely used technique for
solving stochastic optimization problems with time average
5Θ is the feasible set of θ, i.e., the set of all possible network information
realizations, and f(θ) is the probability distribution function (pdf) of θ.
6We leave the details in [31], as the method is standard. Moreover, solving
the stochastic opitmalization problem is not the main contribution of this work.
5constraints, such as the social welfare maximization problem
(9) in this work (with T → ∞), where the user participatory
constraint (b) is the time average constraint. Hence, we intro-
duce the Lyapunov optimization technique to solve the sensor
selection problem (9) with no future information.
1) Queue Definition: The key idea of Lyapunov optimiza-
tion technique is to use the stability of queues to ensure that
the time average constraints are satisfied. Following this idea,
we first introduce a virtual queue (qn) for each user n. This
virtual queue is used for buffering the virtual allocation request
of each user. Here, we use the prefix “virtual” to denote that the
request is not actually initiated by the user, but rather, it is used
to reflect the requirement of the user participatory constraint.
Namely, one virtual request represents that “to satisfy the user
participatory constraint, the user should be selected as sensor
in one additional time slot”. Hence, the backlog of a virtual
queue denotes the total number of virtual requests in the queue
(which may not be an integer), i.e., the total number of addi-
tional time slots that the user should be selected as sensor (in
order to meet his participatory constraint).
2) Queue Dynamics: With the above queue definition, each
virtual request of user n will enter into the queue with a
constant arrival rate of Dn. Let x†n[t] ∈ {0, 1} denotes
whether user n is selected as sensor in time slot t (under certain
sensor selection policy), and d†n , dn(x†n) = 1T
∑
t∈T x
†
n[t]
denote the average allocation probability of user n. Intuitively,
x†n[t] = 1 implies that one virtual request of user n leaves the
queue at slot t. Hence, the virtual request of user n will leave
the queue with an average departure rate of d†n.
Let qtn denote the queue backlog of user n in slot t, and
let qt , {qtn,∀n ∈ N} denote the queue backlog vector of all
users. For each user n, given the constant arrival of his virtual
request and the allocation x†n[t] in each slot t (departure), we
have the following dynamic equation for his virtual queue:
qt+1n =
[
qtn − x†n[t]
]+
+Dn, (11)
where [x]+ = max(x, 0).
Next, we show how to connect the queue stability condition
with the user participatory constraint in our problem. We say
a virtual queue qn is rate stable, if
lim
t→∞
qtn
t
= 0 with probability 1.
By the queue stability theorem [30], a queue qn is rate stable if
and only if the arrival rate is no larger than the departure rate,
i.e., Dn ≤ d†n. This establishes the equivalence between the
queue stability condition and the user participatory constraint.
That is, to guarantee the user participatory constraint in our
problem, we only need to ensure that the associated virtual
queue is rate stable under the proposed policy.
3) Queue Stability: Now we study the queue stability using
the Lyapunov drift. We first define the Lyapunov function:
J [t] , 1
2
∑
n∈N
(qtn)
2. (12)
The Lyapunov drift in each slot t is defined as the change of
Lyapunov function from one slot to the next, i.e.,
∆[t] , J [t+ 1]− J [t]. (13)
By the Lyapunov drift theorem (Th. 4.1 in [30]), if a policy
greedily minimizes the Lyapunov drift ∆[t] in each slot t, then
all backlogs are consistently pushed towards a low level, which
potentially maintains the stabilities of all queues (i.e., ensures
the participatory constraints of all users).
4) Joint Queue Stability and Welfare Maximization: Next,
we analyze the joint queue stability and objective optimization
(i.e., expected social welfare maximization). By the Lyapunov
optimization theorem (Th. 4.2 in [30]), to stabilize the queues
while optimizing the objective, we can use such an allocation
policy that greedily minimizes the following drift-plus-penalty:
Π[t] , ∆[t]− φ · (V [t]− C[t]), (14)
where the (negative) social welfare, i.e., C[t]−V [t], is viewed
as the penalty incurred on each slot t; φ ≥ 0 is a non-negative
control parameter that is chosen to achieve a desirable tradeoff
between the optimality and queue backlog.
We further notice that directly minimizing the drift-plus-
penalty defined in (14) may be difficult (partly because ∆[t] is
a quadratic function). Hence, we will focus on minimizing a
specific upper-bound of the drift-plus-penalty to achieve the
joint stability and optimization.
Next, we give such an upper-bound. Notice that
∆[t] ≤ 1
2
∑
n∈N
(
x†n[t]
2 +D2n + 2 · qtn · (Dn − x†n[t])
)
≤ B +
∑
n∈N
qtn · (Dn − x†n[t]),
(15)
where B ,
∑
n∈N
1+D2n
2 is a constant.
7 Then, we have the
following upper-bound for the drift-plus-penalty in (14):
Π[t] ≤ B +
∑
n∈N
qtn · (Dn − x†n[t])− φ ·
(
V [t]− C[t]). (16)
By the Lyapunov optimization theory, it is easy to show that
minimizing the above upper-bound of the drift-plus-penalty is
equivalent to minimizing the drift-plus-penalty itself, in terms
of the queue stability and objective optimization.
Remark. Beyond following the standard Lyapunov opti-
mization framework [30], our own contributions in this part
are two-fold. First, we explicitly define the virtual queue,
and analytically connect the user participatory constraint and
the queue stability. This is the basis of applying Lyapunov
optimization in our problem. Second, we propose an upper-
bound (16) for the drift-plus-penalty, which is problem-specific
and does not have a generic form suitable for all problems. The
later on-line policy is based on this upper-bound.
B. On-line Allocation Policy
Based on the above theoretical analysis, we now design an
on-line policy that aims at minimizing the drift-plus-penalty
upper-bound in (16) in each time slot. We present such a
Lyapunov optimization based policy in Policy 1.
7The first inequality follows because ([q−x]+ +D)2 ≤ q2 +x2 +D2 +
2q · (D − x). The second inequality follows because x†n[t]2 ≤ 1.
6Policy 1: Lyapunov-based Policy (Information Symme-
try)
Initialization: q = q0;
for each time slot t = 0, 1, ..., T do
Allocation Rule:
x†[t] = argmax
x[t]
(
V [t]− C[t] +
∑
n∈N
qtn
φ
· xn[t]
)
Updating Rule:
qt+1n =
[
qt − x†n[t]
]+
+Dn, ∀n ∈ N
1) Algorithm Design: The proposed Policy 1 consists of
an allocation rule and an updating rule in each time slot.
The allocation rule determines the sensor selection (allocation)
x†[t] in each slot t, based on the current network information
θ[t] and the current queue backlogs qt, aiming at minimizing
the upper-bound of drift-plus-penalty in (16). The updating
rule updates the queue backlogs based on the current allocation
result x†[t] according to (11). It is easy to see that Policy 1
relies only on the current network information and the past
sensor selection history (captured by the queue backlogs),
while not on any complete or stochastic future information.
2) Optimality: Now we provide the optimality of Policy 1.
Let S†[t] denote the social welfare generated in each slot t,
and S∗ denote the maximum social welfare benchmark with
the stochastic information (derived in Section III). Formally,
Theorem 1 (Optimality).
lim
T→∞
1
T
∑
t∈T
E(S†[t]) ≥ S∗ − B
φ
.
The proof follows standard Lyapunov optimization theory
[30]. By Theorem 1, we can easily find that Policy 1 converges
to the maximum social welfare benchmark asymptotically, with
a controllable approximation error bound O(1/φ).
Intuitively, in Policy 1, each virtual queue can be viewed as
a regulation factor for lowering (regulating) the sensing cost
of that user, and hence increasing the selection probability of
that user. By the updating rule in Policy 1, we can further
obtain the following approximation for the queue backlog8
qtn ≈ q0n −
t−1∑
k=0
x†n[k] + t ·Dn.
This implies that the time-attenuated queue backlog q
t
n
t can be
used to approximate the gap between the required allocation
probability (i.e., Dn) and the actual allocation probability till
slot t till slot t (i.e.,
∑t−1
k=0 x
†
n[k]
t ). Notice that the queue backlog
qtn is bounded, hence the above gap goes to zero as t→∞.
V. AUCTION-BASED ON-LINE SENSOR SELECTION
POLICY
In this section, we consider the asymmetric information
scenario (regarding the current information), where the sensing
cost of each user n realized in each time slot t (i.e., cn[t]) is
8This approximation is obtained by simply omitting the operation [.]+.
Policy 2: Auction-based Policy (Information Asymmetry)
Initialization: µ = µ0;
for each time slot t = 0, 1, ..., T do
Denote c′n[t] as the bid of each user n;
Allocation Rule:
x‡[t] = argmax
x[t]
V [t]−
∑
n∈N
xn[t] · (c′n[t]− µtn)
Payment Rule:
pn[t] = x
‡
n[t] ·
(
V ‡[t]− C‡−n[t]− S˜]−n[t] + µtn
)
Updating Rule:
µt+1n =
1
φ
·
([
φ · µtn − x‡n[t]
]+
+Dn
)
, ∀n ∈ N
his private information, and cannot be observed by the SP.
Obviously, without this private sensing cost, the SP cannot
implement the allocation rule in Policy 1.
A. Auction Mechanism Design
We design an (reverse) VCG auction to address the credible
information disclosure of users in each time slot, where the SP
is the auctioneer (buyer), and users are the bidders (sellers).
A standard VCG auction usually consists of an allocation
rule (winner determination) and a payment rule. Our proposed
auction mechanism involves a set of regulation factors (which
are introduced for ensuring the user participatory constraint),
hence includes an additional updating rule for the regulation
factors. We present the detailed auction mechanism in Policy
2. Next we will explain these rules in details.
For convenience, we denote c′n[t] as each user n’s bid
(report) regarding his sensing cost in each slot t, and µtn as
the regulation factor (similar as the virtual queue in Section
IV) associated with each user n in each slot t.
1) Allocation Rule: The allocation rule aims at maximiz-
ing a regulated social welfare in each time slot:
S˜[t] , V [t]−
∑
n∈N
xn[t] · c˜n[t],
where c˜n[t] , c′n[t]− µtn is the regulated sensing cost of user
n, depending on both the user bid and the regulator factor.
For convenience, we denote x‡[t] , {x‡n[t],∀n ∈ N} as the
allocation result in slot t (i.e., that maximizes S˜[t]).
2) Payment Rule: The payment to user n in each time slot
t is: (i) pn[t] = 0 if user n is not selected, i.e., x‡n[t] = 0, or
(ii) if user n is selected, i.e., x‡n[t] = 1, then
pn[t] = V
‡[t]− C‡−n[t]− S˜]−n[t] + µtn, (17)
where V ‡[t] is the total sensing value under x‡[t], C‡−n[t] =∑
k 6=n x
‡
k[t] · c˜k[t] is the total sensing cost except that of user
n under x‡[t], and S˜]−n[t] is the maximum achievable social
welfare when excluding user n in the system. The first 3 terms
correspond to the payment in a standard VCG auction. The last
term is used to compensate the user cost regulation.
73) Updating Rule: Inspired by Policy 1, we have:
µt+1n =
1
φ ·
([
φ · µtn − x‡n[t]
]+
+Dn
)
, ∀n ∈ N .
The above updating rule is exactly same as that in Policy 1, by
simply viewing φ · µtn as qtn. Obviously, if users are truthful,
then the above allocation/updating rule achieves the exactly
same allocation and performance as in Policy 1.
B. Truthfulness and Optimality
Theorem 2 (Truthfulness). The auction in Policy 2 is truthful.
Proof: Due to the space limit, we only show that each
user n has no incentive to report (bid) a cost higher than his
true cost.9 There are 4 possible outcomes:
(a) {loss, loss}: user n loses when bidding both truthfully and
non-truthfully. He receives a zero payment in both strategies.
(b) {win, loss}: user n wins (loses) when bidding truthfully
(non-truthfully). He receives a smaller payment (i.e., zero)
when bidding non-truthfully.
(c) {loss, win}: user n loses (wins) when bidding truthfully
(non-truthfully). This is practically impossible, as a user losing
with a lower cost will never win when submitting a higher cost.
(d) {win, win}: user n wins when bidding both truthfully and
non-truthfully. We will show that user n receives the same
payment in both strategies. First, the third term and the last
term in (17) are obviously identical in both strategies. Second,
the first two terms in (17) are also identical due to the following
assert: If an allocation vector x∗ maximizes the social welfare,
then, excluding any user n and removing the grids sensed by
user n (under x∗), the remaining vector x∗−n maximizes the
social welfare in the remaining system.
Theorem 3 (Optimality). The auction in Policy 2 achieves the
same asymptotically optimal social welfare as in Policy 1.
Proof: By the truthfulness given in Theorem 2, together
with the observation that the allocation and updating rules in
Policy 2 are exactly same as those in Policy 1, we can prove
the optimality immediately.
Remark. The above Policy 2 is truthful only when users
are myopic, in the sense that they only care about the current
benefits in each time slot, while not anticipating the potential
impacts of their bidding strategies on the future benefits. As a
counter-example, a non-myopic user may report a large fake
cost. By doing so, the SP will assign a large regulation factor to
the user (in order to satisfy the user’s participatory constraint),
which potentially increases the user’s future payment. We will
study the model with non-myopic users in our future work.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In our simulations, we launch a participatory sensing ap-
plication in a middle-scale virtual city with size 10km×10km.
The whole area is divided into 2500 grids, each corresponding
to a square of 200m × 200m. Users move according to the
random walk model: in each time slot, each user jumps from
9The proof for “users are not willing to report costs lower than the true
values” is similar. Please refer to [31] for details.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of Two Scenarios: (a) no hotspot and (b) one hotspot.
the original location (grid) to another location (grid) randomly
according to certain probability distribution. For illustrative
purposes, we assume that the sensing region of each user in
each time slot is a disk, centered at his location, with a radius
randomly picked from [400m, 800m].10 We run the system in a
period of 10, 000 time slots, which is long enough for obtaining
stable outcomes under our adopted policies.
A. Simulation Scenarios
We consider two different simulation scenarios (a) and (b),
depending on the different data value distributions in different
areas, as shown in Fig. 2. In scenario (a), there is no hotspot,
and all grids are of the similar importance. Hence, the data
value in different areas follows an i.i.d. distribution. In scenario
(b), there is one hotspot, and the grids near to the centre of the
hotspot are more important than those far from the hotspot,
and hence have larger data values. Note that any scenario
with multiple hotspots can be viewed as an intermediate case
between (a) and (b). For fair comparison, we set the average
data value in the whole area as 0.5 for both scenarios.
B. Performance Comparisons
Now we compare the performance of our proposed policy
with the RADP-VPC policy proposed in [24] and [25], a well-
known policy that considers the participation incentive.11 To
draw a more convincing conclusion, we also compare our
policy with those not considering the participation incentive,
e.g., random selection and greedy selection (both are widely
used in practical applications such as Waze [10]).12
1) Dropping Probability: We first compare the user drop-
ping probability under different policies. In this simulation, we
set the dropping threshold as 0.5 for all users. Namely, if the
allocation probability of a user is less than 0.5, the user will
drop out of the system.13 Fig. 3 illustrates the dynamics of
user allocation probabilities as well as the dropping of users.
10We will consider the more practical mobility model and sensing region
scenario based on real data traces in our future work.
11In the RADP-VPC policy, each user n’s cost is regulated by a virtual
credit vn, and the virtual credit vn is updated in the following way: (i) vn =
vn + α if user n is not selected as sensor in the previous slot, and (ii)
vn = 0 if user n is selected as sensor in the previous slot, where α > 0
is a controllable parameter. Intuitively, a larger α can better satisfy the user
participatory constraint, but may reduce the generated social welfare.
12In the greedy (random) policy, users are selected one by one in a
descending (random) order of their generated social welfares.
13To reduce the “start effect” where a user may mistakenly drop in the first
few slots (due to the low allocation probability in these slots), we assume that
all users will be selected as sensor in the first 40 time slots.
8Fig. 3. Allocation Probability Dynamics and User Dropping in Scenario (a) (the first row) and Scenario (b) (the second row). The dropping of a user is
illustrated by the sudden decrease of his allocation probability. The percentage of dropping users is denoted by the blue shadow area.
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Fig. 4. Average Social Welfare under Different Policies in Scenario (a) (left) and Scenario (b) (right). Policy: (3a)-(3c) Lyapunov-based policy (φ = {20, 10, 5})
proposed in this work; (4a)-(4c) RADP-VPC policy (α = {1, 0.5, 0.2}) proposed in [24] and [25]; (5) Random policy; (6) Greedy policy.
We can see that, in scenario (a) (the first row), more than 70%
of users drop under the greedy or random sensor selection
policy, and around 25% of users drop under the RADP-VPC
policy (α = 1); and in scenario (b) (the second row), more
than 90% of users drop under the greedy or random sensor
selection policy, and more than 50% of users drop under the
RADP-VPC policy (α = 1). Our proposed policy, however,
retains all users in both scenarios.
We can further see that under the same policy (except our
proposed one), more users drop in the scenario (b) than in
scenario (a). The reason is as follows. In scenario (b) with one
hotspot, most of the data value is concentrated in the hotspot
area, and hence a large total sensing value can potentially be
collected by a small number of users (located in the hotspot
area). In scenario (a) with no hotspot, however, the data value
is uniformly distributed in all areas, and hence a large total
sensing value can be collected only by a large enough number
of users (distributed in the whole area). Hence, to achieve the
same level of sensing value, the number of sensors needed in
scenario (b), on average, is smaller than that needed in scenario
(a). Accordingly, the user allocation probability is lower, and
hence more users drop, in scenario (b).
2) Social Welfare: We then compare the average social
welfare under different policies in Fig. 4. Curve (1) is the maxi-
mum social welfare with no participatory constraint, and serves
as an upper-bound of the maximum achievable social welfare
with the participatory constraint. Curve (2) is the maximum
social welfare benchmark (with the participatory constraint)
with complete or stochastic future information derived in
Section III. The gap between curves (1) and (2) is called the
incentive cost, which is used to guarantee the user long-term
participation incentive. In our simulations, the incentive cost
is approximately 6% in scenario (a) and 8% in scenario (b).
Namely, the incentive cost is higher in scenario (b) than (a)
due to the higher dropping probability.
Curves (3a)-(3c) denote the social welfares achieved by our
proposed Lyapunov-based Policy 1 or 2 (with φ = 20, 10, and
5, respectively). Our policy converges to the optimal bench-
mark asymptotically, with very small approximation errors,
e.g., {1%, 2%, 3%} in scenario (a) and {1.5%, 3%, 4.5%}
in scenario (b). Note that the approximation error bound is
controllable, via choosing different values of φ. We can further
see that the benchmark (i.e., the maximum social welfare) is
higher in scenario (b), as the same amount of sensing value
can potentially be collected by fewer users in scenario (b) than
in scenario (a). Accordingly, our proposed policy can achieve
a higher social welfare in scenario (b).
Curves (4a)-(4c) denotes the social welfares achieved by
the RADP-VPC policy (with α = 1, 0.5, and 0.2, respectively)
proposed in [24] and [25]. Obviously, the performance of
RADP-VPC largely depends on the choice of parameter α. In
scenario (a), the social welfare gap between the RADP-VPC
policy and our policy ranges from 15% (when α = 1) to 50%
(when α = 0.2). In scenario (b), this gap increases to 40%
and 75%. In fact, different from our policy or benchmark, the
RADP-VPC policy achieves a worse performance in scenario
(b), due to the higher dropping probability in scenario (b). This
illustrates the importance of considering the long-term partici-
patory incentive in a sensing system.
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Finally, Curves (5) and (6) denotes the social welfares
achieved by the random and greedy sensor selection policies.
Neither policy considers the long-term participation incentive,
hence users drop quickly (see Fig. 3) and the social welfare
decreases dramatically. The social welfare gap between the
these two policies and our policy is larger than 60% in scenario
(a) and 85% in scenario (b). Similarly to the RADP-VPC
policy, these two policies both achieves a worse performance in
scenario (b) than in (a), due to the higher dropping probability
in scenario (b). Counter-intuitively, the greedy policy achieves
a worse performance than the random policy, due to the
higher user dropping probability in the greedy policy. This
also illustrates the importance of considering the long-term
participatory incentive in a sensing system.
C. Impact of Participatory Constraint
So far, we have shown in Fig. 4 that our policy converges to
the maximum social welfare benchmark asymptotically. Next,
we show in Figs. 5-7 that how the participatory constraint
affects this benchmark. We provide the results in scenario (a)
only, as those in scenarios (b)-(d) are similar.
Fig. 5 illustrates the user allocation probability vs the num-
ber of participating users, under different sensing costs (where
C/W denotes the average ratio of unit sensing cost and unit
data value). Obviously, the allocation probability decreases
with both the sensing cost and the number of users (due to
the partial conflict of their sensing activities). Note that in this
result, there is no participatory constraint. Namely, users never
drop, and in each time slot they will be selected based on the
realized costs. This result is useful for explaining the different
impacts of participatory constraint discussed later.
Fig. 6 illustrates the maximum social welfare (benchmark)
vs the number of participating users N , under different drop-
ping thresholds. We can see that when the dropping threshold
is small (e.g., Dn ≤ 0.35), the maximum social welfare always
increases with the number of users, and the increase rate
becomes larger with a smaller dropping threshold. When the
dropping threshold is large (e.g., Dn ≥ 0.4), the maximum
social welfare first increases with the number of users, and
then decreases with the number of users. This implies that in a
sensing system with a mild or no participatory constraint (e.g.,
a small or zero dropping threshold), we can always increase
the social welfare by involving more users into the sensing
system. With a stringent participatory constraint (e.g., a large
dropping threshold), however, involving more users may not
always increase the social welfare, due to the high incentive
cost to retain users in the system.
Fig. 7 illustrates the maximum social welfare (benchmark)
vs the dropping threshold Dn, with different numbers of users.
Each dash line denotes the maximum social welfare without
the participatory constraint (i.e., the upperbound in Fig. 4). We
can see that the social welfare decreases with the dropping
threshold, as a higher dropping threshold implies that more
incentive cost is needed to retain the users in the system. We
can further see that such a welfare degradation (induced by the
incentive cost) is more severe with a larger number of users,
as the total incentive cost increases with the number of users.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the optimal sensor selection prob-
lem in a general time-dependent and location-aware participa-
tory sensing system with the user long-term participatory con-
straint. We proposed Lyapunov based on-line sensor selection
(auction) policies, which do not rely on future information and
achieve the optimal off-line benchmark performance asymp-
totically. There are several possible extensions in the future
work. An interesting one is to study the truthful mechanism
when users are not myopic and can somehow anticipate the
impact of their activities on the future time slots.
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